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Four Questions about Food Aid and
Agriculture'
Over the past 30 years, Bangladesh has become a
chronic food-deficit country which has relied
increasingly on food grain imports to sustain its
rapidly growing population at minium calorie levels.
These averaged four per cent of domestic production
in the 1950s, nine per cent in the 1960s, and 15 per cent
in the 1970s. During the 1950s, most food grain
imports were purchased commercially by the
government, but since 1963 the major portion has
been supplied as food aid. Since 1976, food aid has
contributed nearly 90 per cent of total food grain
imports and has constituted over 10 per cent of total
food grain availability.
The extent of Bangladesh's dependence on food aid
- it is one of the main recipients in the developing
world - gives rise to concern about its efficacy as a
resource-transfer. Conventional wisdom maintains
that high levels of food-aid imports cause disincentives
to local producers through agricultural policy and
prices, leading to a decline in investment in and output
from domestic agriculture. In the absence of a general
equilibrium price and output determination model,
this article examines the evidence in Bangladesh of
disincentives (and incentives) for the agricultural
sector from food aid, focusing on foodgrains which
predominate in farming and are most directly affected
by food aid. The analysis centres on four questions
relating to the structure of incentives facing
Bangladeshi farmers. First, have agricultural prices
been too low - absolutely and relatively - during the
past 25 years of food-aid imports? Second, if output
prices had been higher without (or with less) food aid,
what would have been the likely output response?
Third, is there evidence of complacency among
policymakers toward public-sector agricultural in-
vestment and development policies because of food
aid? Fourth, did food aid provide any incentives to
agriculture?
'This article is based on a chapter in a doctoral dissertation at
Stanford University entitled The impact offoodaidon the Bangladesh
economy. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
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Were Agricultural Prices too Low?
Given the high volume of food grain imports to
Bangladesh during the past 25 years, there is little
doubt that food grain prices have been lower than they
would have been without imports. Since the major
portion of imports came as food aid, food aid must
bear responsibility for part of this price moderation.
The question then is whether or not the prevailing
food grain prices were a discentive to farmers. To hold
scarcity prices in check is quite different from
depressing prices that are barely remunerative to start
with. Moreover, in land-scarce Bangladesh, where
traditioflal rain fed agriculture had begun to press on
natural limits to production by mid-century, the issues
of technological change and the opportunity to invest
in modern inputs weigh heavily in the discussion.
Inter-sectoral terms of trade
The domestic terms of trade between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors are an important
determinant of the distribution of income between
sectors. As such, they provide a measure of each
sector's capacity to save and invest generally, or, more
specifically, a measure of the incentives to produce
and sell products to the other sector.
The terms of trade for agriculture in India at the time
of independence and partition were 40-50 per cent
higher than the 25-year average prior to the 1943
wartime Bengal famine [Wall 1978]. While these
estimates for the pre-independence period in India are
not applicable to Bangladesh, Government of
Pakistan [1951] data for the 1947 to 1950 period -
using the common 1939 baseyear index for India and
Pakistan - suggest that the agricultural terms of trade
in Bangladesh remained highly favourable, with the
GDP, at constant prices, of total agriculture also
rising at 2.8 per cent per annum up to FY54 (financial
year: July 1953-June 1954).
Following the end of the Korean war boom, the
domestic terms of trade in Bangladesh moved
decidedly against the agricultural sector and pro-
duction declined, reaching an historical low in FY 55.
Figure 1 Agricultural terms of trade
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This adverse trend reversed the following year, and
agriculture's terms-of-trade position improved steadily
throughout the subsequent decade. By FY 69 the
terms of trade in favour of agriculture were the highest
in history, roughly 40 per cent higher than in FY 52.
During this same period, food grain imports had risen
from 2 to 10 per cent of net domestic availability. (Net
availability production less 10 per cent allowance for
storage losses and retention for seed plus imports plus
net carry over of public stocks.)
No detailed analysis of the domestic terms of trade in
Bangladesh has been made for the l970s. The price of
rice relative to the price of manufactured goods, which
provides an approximation of the agricultural terms of
trade, indicates wide fluctuations but no apparent
trend. Between FY 71 and FY 80, food aid constituted
10 per cent of net food grain availability; imports
constituted 14 per cent. From FY 74, food grain
production has grown at an estimated rate of 2.5 per
cent per annum.
Given the complex procedures of negotiating and
ordering food aid commodities and the time lags
involved with shipping and local transport, reliance on
food aid probably exacerbated the fluctuations in rice
prices and thus the fluctuations in the rice/manu-
factures price ratio [Clay 1981]. But the evidence
suggests that agricultural producer incentives, as
indicated by the domestic terms of trade, were not
significantly distorted by food aid or by total food
grain imports.
The terms-of-trade indices discussed above relate
agricultural prices to the weighted price of all
manufactures. The denominator includes manu-
factured consumption goods as well as agricultural
inputs. For traditional agricultural systems that use a
low level of purchased inputs, such terms-of-trade
measures are appropriate. But as the technology shifts
toward modern practices that employ increasing
amounts of purchased inputs, a terms-of-trade index
that relates agricultural prices to the prices of
agricultural inputs becomes more indicative of
producer incentives. The rice/fertiliser price ratio
indicates a slight upward trend from FY 57 to FY 75,
but a 40 per cent decline thereafter, reflecting a
reduction in fertiliser subsidies in the late-l970s.
Nevertheless, all the fertiliser that has been supplied
during the past two decades - including the last five
years - has been taken by farmers, and fertiliser is still
a relatively small component of total agricultural
production costs, some 20 per cent of purchased input
costs for HYV (high yielding variety) rice cultivation.
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Note: annual data by Lewis and Hussain [1967] and Lewis [1970] adjusted to a 1961/62 baseyear
to coincide with Wall's [1978] historical series.
There has been a gradual upward trend for two
decades in the rice/wage price ratio. On average, hired
labour continues to be the major purchased input in
food grain cultivation, constituting from 40 to 60 per
cent of input purchases.
Profitability of food grain cultivation
Farm management data in Bangladesh are weak, but a
review of the calculated average benefit/cost ratios
offers some indication of the profitability of food
grain cultivation and thus the structure of incentives
facing farmers in Bangladesh. An analysis of 40
surveys taken between 1973 and 1980 suggests that,
despite considerable variability between seasons and
years, the general picture is one of favourable price
structures to farmers during the 1970s. The calculated
average benefit/cost ratios range from 2.0 to 4.5 for
HYVs, excluding imputed family labour costs. Ratios
for wheat (which has witnessed the more rapid
expansion) are somewhat lower than those for rice,
but still profitable. The discrepancy between traditional
varieties and HYVs is not surprising considering the
large yield difference between varieties.
The generally favourable picture must, however, be
qualified by noting the significant differences in
Figure 2 Production and imports of food grains'1948/49-1979/80
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benefit/cost ratios for tenant farmers compared to
owner-operators. In a system where tenant farmers by
tradition provide all the production inputs and then
share output 50:50 with the landlords, many
benefit/cost ratios for tenants using traditional
varieties are less than 1.0, indicating a net loss which
translates into growing indebtedness. Ratios for
tenants using HYVs are generally higher, ranging
from 0.8 to nearly 3.0, excluding family labour costs.
Incentives for investment in modern agricultural
technologies
Since their introduction in the early-1960s, modern
agricultural inputs - fertilisers, pesticides, mechanical
irrigation equipment, and HYVs - have been
supplied solely by the government through a public-
sector agency, the Bangladesh Agricultural Develop-
ment Corporation (BADC). Most inputs have been
imported. The major exceptions are urea fertiliser,
which has been produced domestically from natural
gas, and second-generation HYV seed, which has been
bred and multiplied locally. Compared to existing
technological potential (and international standards),
the current utilisation of modern inputs in Bangladesh
is low.
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The government has consistently subsidised input
prices for the stated purpose of inducing farmers to
adopt and use the new technologies. For example, the
subsidy element on fertiliser has ranged from 30 to
over 50 per cent; for different types of irrigation
equipment subsidies have ranged from 25 per cent (on
shallow tubewells) to virtually loo per cent (on gravity
irrigation schemes). Input supplies and subsidies
directly affect producer incentives, and they give rise
to important questions about public finance and inter-
sectoral resource transfers. A brief review of price
policy and use for the major inputs suggests that
supply at prevailing subsidised prices rather than low
output prices has restricted the growth of input use.
Fertiliser given the high profitability of fertiliser use
in rice cultivation (confirmed in farm management
and production function studies), the fertiliser market
has been characterised as one of persistent excess
demand. This is in part due to the large subsidy
element in fertiliser prices. Availability, determined by
government capacity to acquire commercial or aid-
financed imports, has governed offtake.
Irrigation again input supplies have been limited and
official prices to farmers have been heavily subsidised.
Virtually all the equipment (pumps and tubewells)
supplied was rented (or, in effect, water was sold to
farmers) on a seasonal basis and less than 50 per cent
of the total capital and operating expenses of the
government operation was recouped from farmers.
Water from large gravity irrigation schemes has been
virtually free to farmers.
Because of inherent 'lumpiness', irrigation equipment
is more difficult to re-trade. Consequently, in
allocating limited irrigation equipment, price has been
less important than political influence with the supply
corporation or its agents. Farmers (or farm groups)
with political access have obtained pumps at
subsidised prices, and then used the pumps often at
less than their engineered capacities. With the heavy
subsidies there has been little incentive to utilise the
pumps to their maximum, and consequently the
average capacity utilisation of irrigation equipment in
Bangladesh has been low - estimated in recent years
at 50 per cent.
In the late l970s, a change in policy was initiated to
transfer gradually small-scale irrigation equipment to
the private sector, whereby pumps would be sold to
farmers. Because of the policy change, numerous
studies (mostly by donor agencies) have been made to
estimate the farm-level profitability of pump invest-
ments. Calculated internal rates of return, at full
economic costs without subsidies, have ranged
between 25 and 50 per cent for select types of small-
scale irrigation equipment. With subsidies, of course,
the incentives have been even higher, indicating
generally adequate incentives, since over 20 years all
irrigation equipment supplied by the BADC in each
season, except one, was taken up by farmers.
The exception was during the FY 77 boro (winter)
season when renting out of pump sets - the major
source of irrigation - dropped 22 per cent and rice
acreage declined 26 per cent from the previous year
[Clay 1979, Ahmed 1981]. The short-run structure of
incentives had deteriorated for farmers prior to that
season. The previous crop year, FY 76, had set a
record for rice production. The just-harvested FY 77
main monsoon aman rice crop had nearly equalled the
previous year's record. Food imports remained high,
partly due to the time lags in supply. Rice prices had
dropped some 30 per cent in real terms from the
previous year (45 per cent in money terms) during the
previous six months. Government also chose this
moment to increase rental charges for irrigation
equipment.
But the decline in mechanised irrigation and rice
production more generally was not solely a question of
relative prices. First, 42 per cent of the decline in pump
renting occurred in two southern districts, Barisal and
Patuakhali, where, according to field reports, farmers'
grain stores were literally overflowing from previous
good harvests. In these two districts transportation,
marketing and government procurement have tradi-
tionally been less developed than in northern districts.
Similar problems occurred in other districts, in spite of
a stepped up domestic procurement programme which
netted more than three times the previous record
procurement. Second, 45 per cent of the decline in
output occurred in one district, Sylhet, where early
flooding destroyed much of the crop. Third, fertiliser
offtake, in spite of a substantial real price increase,
rose at nearly the same rate as total fertiliser offtake
increased for the entire year.
High-yielding varieties (HYVs) subsidies on HYV
seeds, both imported and locally multiplied, in terms
of supply costs have been relatively small. Once
released, HYV seeds can be multiplied by farmers
themselves and, consequently, an active private
market exists for seeds. Regarding the relative
profitability of HYVs, the average benefit/cost ratios
referred to above suggest that HYV cultivation has
been uniformly more profitable than traditional
variety cultivation on farmers' fields during the same
season.
Domestic and international prices of rice
For traded commodities, the comparison of domestic
prices with world prices is a commonly used indicator
of distortions in agricultural output prices. Table 1
suggests that during the past two decades, in spite of
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Table 1
Comparison of domestic and international prices of rice
1957-79
the high level of food imports, the domestic price of
rice in Bangladesh in most years was considerably
higher than the international price, even after
discounting for an overvalued exchange rate. For
Bangladesh, the ratios reflect the low productivity in
agriculture combined with growing demand due to
population and income factors.
However, in the late 1970s, the domestic/international
price ratio at the shadow exchange rate dropped below
1.0. This shift in relative prices was caused in part by
the government's deliberate policy of moderating
consumer food prices aided by good harvests. Büt the
currency devaluation in May 1975 is an additional
factor so that for 1976 and 1977, the ratios at the
official exchange rate are probably more representative
of the price relative. For 1978, the world price changed
abruptly, not the Bangladesh price.
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Another relevant measure compares input/output
price structures across countries. PetFrson [1979] in
estimating real prices received by farmers in 53
countries by deflating money prices of output with
money prices of fertilizer found that during 1968-70
farmers in Pakistan received real prices because of
fertiliser subsidies nearly as high as farmers in the
major developed, exporting countries, where output
prices were heavily supported by the respective
governments.
Commerical imports in addition to food aid flows
In the Asian context, the price of rice is perhaps the
single most important barometer for measuring social
well-being and political stability. In self-interest and in
the interests of its citizens, governments are always
attuned to the rice markets and often intervene quickly
1957 724 4.8 113 111 1.36 1.02
1958 770 4.8 120 127 1.26 0.94
1959 882 4.8 138 99 1.86 1.39
1960 847 4.8 132 96 1.83 1.38
1961 808 4.8 126 98 1.71 1.29
1962 830 4.8 130 99 1.75 1.31
1963 863 4.8 135 106 1.70 1.27
1964 721 4.8 113 109 1.38 1.04
1965 879 4.8 137 112 1.63 1.22
1966 1092 4.8 171 132 1.73 1.30
1967 1209 4.8 189 137 1.84 1.38
1968 1124 4.8 176 158 1.48 1.11
1969 1233 4.8 193 137 1.88 1.41
1970 1160 4.8 181 110 2.20 1.65
1971 1326 4.8 207 87 3.17 2.38
1972 1829 7.5 183 103 2.37 1.78
1973 2695 7.8 259 251 1.38 1.03
1974 4970 8.0 466 481 1.29 0.97
1975 6013 12.0 376 288 1.74 1.31
1976 3465 15.0 173 228 1.01 0.76
1977 4137 15.0 207 244 1.13 0.85
1978 4361 15.0 218 344 0.85 0.63
6005 15.0 300 (288) (1.39) (1.04)
through stock release and/or importation if prices rise
sharply relative to other prices.
During the 1970s, Bangladesh repeatedly used scarce
foreign exchange to purchase grain on world markets
- in addition to food aid imports - to ensure
availability for ration distribution and to help
moderate domestic prices. Some of the government's
commercial purchases were made because of delays in
food aid shipments; some because of differences in
opinion (with donors) about import requirements;
and some because of pending political events, as food
'insurance' prior to elections [Clay 1981]. But the fact
that commercial purchases were made - particularly
after 1975 when the Aid Consortium to Bangladesh
informally guaranteed to underwrite all food grain
import requirements - indicates a real perception
that in the short-run consumer prices were likely to
become intolerably high.
Counterfactual: What if Output Prices Had
Been Higher?
How responsive is output to prices?
After 20 years and literally hundreds of empirical
investigations, the notion that farmers respond to
price changes - even farmers in predominantly
subsistence economies - is no longer seriously at
issue. The extent to which farmers respond, however,
remains controversial, largely because of the difficulties
of measuring supply response, particularly in a
developing economy such as Bangladesh: during the
past 20 years, agricultural technology has been
changing rapidly, infrastructural development has
been equally rapid, the pace of demographic change
has been unprecedented. The extent and nature of
government policy intervention have fluctuated with
political instability. The dynamics of supply involve
complex interrelationships at different levels of
interaction.
Bearing in mind this caution about placing too much
confidence in estimates of supply response, it should
be noted that all the studies to date for Bangladesh
report broadly similar conclusions. The aggregate
response of rice production to price movements is
positive, but low [Hussain 1964; Cummings 1974;
Ahmed 1981]. This important finding is illustrated by
the results of the analysis by the author of data for
food grain production covering the period 1956/57 to
1979/80, approximately the era of food aid and the
introduction of modern agricultural inputs.2
The supply functions estimated related area of production to prices
of the previous years, and variables representing weather, variability
of prices (risk) and a time trend. A complementary attempt to
measure price effects on yield or total output were unsuccessful (for
food grains and rice). In the estimated food grain output equations,
for example, only trend and rainfall were significant, and together
they explained over 80 per cent of the annual variation in output.
The estimated short-run price elasticity of supply of
acreage is positive but low, at about 0.08: ie a 10 per
cent increase in the relative price of food grains - for
example, due to curtailed imports of food aid, or
higher procurement prices - would induce farmers to
increase their food grain acreage in the next period by
only 0.8 per cent. On the base of 25 mn acres, the
implied increase would be about 200,000 acres which,
at the mean yield level of 0.5 tons/acre, would
translate into an output increase of only 100,000 tons.
By comparison, less than 15,000 nutrient tons of
fertiliser, a four per cent increase in current usage,
would be required to raise output by the same amount.
In a land-scarce environment, questions arise about
the source of expanded food grain area due to relative
price changes. Until the late-1960s in Bangladesh,
fallow land was available in the aus (early monsoon)
season which could be brought into production
without requiring modern technology or inputs, and
without displacing other crops. But the current
situation is basically that, apart from modern
irrigation expansion, any short-run increase in food
grain acreage must come out of other crops, primarily
jute, pulses, and oilseeds. Declines in jute production
have obvious implications for industrial production
and for foreign exchange earnings, while declines in
pulse and oilseed production adversely affect
nutritional status.
Long-run agricultural supply response and factor
rigidity problems
Bangladeshi farmers have pursued lábour-intensive,
land-saving technologies in the face of declining real
wages and rising land values, consistent with the
Hayami and Ruttan [1971] 'induced innovation'
theory, which emphasizes adjustment to factor
proportions and changing relative prices over time.
For example, attempts to introduce mechanised draft
power as a labour substitute have failed for price and
scale reasons. On the other hand, the evidence suggests
that every available opportunity to intensify agri-
cultural production on the limited land base has been
taken.
The average annual 'net sown area' in Bangladesh
during the late 1970s was essentially the same as
during the early 1950s: 20.5 to 21 mn acres. Over the
same period 'total cropped area' increased from 26.5
to 31.2 mn acres. Thus, while the cultivable land base
was at its limit throughout, the cropping intensity rose
from 130 to 150. The major sources of additional
cropped acreage have been modern purchased inputs
in the boro season (mechanised irrigation and HYV
wheat seed) and, until the late 1960s, cultivation of
former fallows in the aus season. Labour-intensive
farmer innovations have also increased cropped
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acreage; for example, dibble-sowing of rice on saline
soils and cultivation of wheat on impervious soils
through ridging and frequent hand irrigations. Both
practices have spread rapidly during the past several
years. Another land-augmenting technology which
has been used increasingly during the 1970s - crop
irrigation with the hand pump - combines labour
intensity with a purchased input [Brammer 1980].
As innovative as the farmers or the research
establishment are, the major source of growth in the
medium term - through increased cropping intensity
and yields - is likely to continue to be additional
modern purchased inputs. So far prices have not
constrained farmers' use of new inputs. The problem
has been the inadequate supply to the farmer dictated
by finance and investment at the macro level.
Distribution of benefits to producers from higher
food grain prices
A substantial proportion (in some years, the majority)
of farm households are net purchasers of rice
[Rahman 1980; Ahmed 1981]. Higher rice prices
effectively decrease the incomes of these households.
Moreover, the seasonal nature of sales at lower, post-
harvest prices and repurchases later at higher prices
exacerbates the loss of income. This evidence of the
marketing structure in Bangladesh obliges us to
qualify the commonly held but simplistic notion that
farmers generally benefit from higher output prices,
including price supports. Price support measures may
be beneficial or detrimental, depending on how they
are targeted. Thus a reduction in the large seasonal
fluctuation in prices rather than an increase in average
prices without stabilisation would probably be of
greater benefit to the majority of Bangladeshi farmers.
Moreover, as Ahmed [1981:40] argues, if price support
programmes require large budgetary resources and
therefore compete with infrastructural investment
programmes (cg irrigation development), 'questions
of priority become urgent'.
Food Aid and Agricultural Policy
Complacency
Changing sectoral priorities
The role of food aid in the evolution of development
policy is a complex issue of political economy. In 1959
there was a clear shift of emphasis in policy for East
Pakistan towards encouraging agricultural develop-
ment. This followed years of neglect and stagnation in
the agricultural sector. It also followed the advent of
the food aid programme which provided direct
support for meeting short-run welfare demands, due
to growing food deficits, without necessitating cuts in
long-run development investment. The productivity
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gains of the l960s and 1970s reflect the increased
priority attached to agriculture (Figure 2).
At the same time, efforts to utilise fully the available
domestic and aid resources, or to mobilise additional
resources, for development investment in Bangladesh
have been less than satisfactory. The public-sector
revenue foregone (opportunity loss) because of
subsidies to consumption and production amounting
to a substantial portion of total potential revenue,
became particularly apparent in the 1970s. Food aid
and other commodity assistance facilitated these
subsidy policies. However, it is not certain that the
subsidy policies, once established, would have been
different if food aid transfers had been smaller.
Agricultural investment and development policies
The sectoral allocations in development budgets
provide an indication of the government's investment
priorities. This increased priority accorded to
agriculture from the beginning of the 1960s is reflected
dramatically in the doubling of agriculture's share of
planned development expenditure. The share going to
water and power - of which irrigation and flood
control comprised about one-half doubled between
the early 1950s and the Third Plan (1965-70); and the
new rural works programme claimed a growing
percentage of investment resources.
Concurrent with increased agricultural investment,
which focused on the supply and subsidisation of
modern agricultural inputs, the government enacted
several policy changes favourable to the farm sector.
Export duties on jute and other export commodities
were reduced. Marketing, price, and procurement
controls on food grains were eased. In addition, an
internal food grain buffer stock system was initiated to
help stabilise prices. Studies by Falcon and Gotsch
[1966] and Mason [1966] stressed the importance of
the food aid programme in providing the cushion
against which the liberalisation of agricultural and
trade policy took place.3
The sectoral allocations of development expenditure
in Bangladesh's First Five Year Plan (1973-78) were
broadly similar to those in Pakistan's Second Plan.
3Mason [1966] summarised this by arguing,'... if no (PL 480) surpluses
had been available, the result would probably have been, in the
Pakistan of the 1950s, a chaotic food price situation in which attempts
at rigid controls would have been accompanied by black markets,
large price fluctuations, and great price differentials between markets.
This, in fact, aptly describes the conditions in grain markets during
the short period following the advent of the Ayub regime (in 1958)
when controls were sharply tightened. PL 480 shipments may have
had an adverse impact on agricultural output in the 1950s, but their
availability in the 1960s made possible a number of measures which
taken together with other actions bearing on farm incentives Set the
stage for a very substantial increase in agricultural productivity'
(pp 52-53).
Table 2
Annual public-sector development expenditure in the agricultural sector as a percentage of total
development expenditure
Source: Bangladesh Ministry of Finance; World Bank.
The budget share allocated to the agricultural sector
(including water resources and rural development)
was 26.3 per cent. However, because the performance
of public-sector expenditure in agriculture was
significantly better than in most other sectors, the
estimated actual share going to agriculture during the
plan period was 32 per cent (see Table 2). The better
performance of agriculture reflects in part the higher
priority attached to the sector in annual development
budgets as distinct from the Five Year Plan. On the
other hand, there was a downward trend in the share
of annual development expenditure allocated to the
agricultural sector during the l970s.
Separating out the components of this trend indicates
the danger of making inferences from movements in
budgetary aggregates. The relative decline in agri-
culture's share came primarily in the water and flood
control subsector. This reflects the policy shift in the
late 1 970s to transferring small-scale irrigation into
the private sector and the reduction in irrigation
subsidies. Institutional rigidities, especially in the
large-scale irrigation subsector, also led to indecision
about future investment strategies. There was a slight
upward trend in the agricultural subsector share which
includes crop research, extension and input supply.
Development budget figures can also be misleading in
that they often include current expenditure components
which cannot be considered as development invest-
ments. In agriculture, for example, substantial
subsidies on fertiliser have been subsumed in the
annual development budget. While the subsidies
represent real resource transfers to the farm sector,
their inclusion in the development budget overstates
the absolute value of capital and iñtermediate
investment resources going to agriculture. In relative
terms, it is difficult to assess how these hidden
components have affected agriculture's budget share,
because other sector estimates reflect the same
accounting procedures. The data do not permit a full
analysis.
The original rationale for input subsidies was to
encourage the adoption of modern technologies.
Whether or not subsidies can still be justified is an
important issue. The discussion above suggests that
farmers' incentives to use modern inputs are high
without subsidies. Regardless, these subsidies have
involved large resource transfers to the agricultural
sector, particularly as the volume of modern inputs
has increased. In the late 1970s, the fertiliser subsidy
was equivalent to more than 10 per cent of the sector's
estimated earnings from rice sales. In addition there
have been large, variable and difficult to estimate
irrigation subsidies.
While the agricultural sector as a whole has benefited
from subsidy transfers, the distribution of benefits has
been weighted toward those farmers having access to
input supplies at or near the official government
prices. Subsidies and scarcities generally exacerbate
inequalities. Regarding the efficiency of use of
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revised budget budget
1979/801973/ 74 1974/ 75 1975/ 76 1976/77 1977/ 78 1978/79
Agriculture 12.4 12.2 12.1 15.2 12.8 14.6 12.7
Rural development 6.6 5.4 5.1 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.1
Water and flood control 15.0 16.4 14.3 11.9 11.9 10.8 10.3
Total agricultural
sector 34.0 34.0 31.5 31.3 28.9 29.3 27.1
Total development
expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 1000 100.0 100.0 100.0
'j
-
subsidised inputs, divisibles like fertiliser that can
easily be retraded have been utilised fully under
current agronomic practices (abstracting from smug-
gling losses). But indivisibles like irrigation equipment
have been grossly underutilised, in part because of the
subsidies [Islam 1977].
In addition to supporting agriculture, through
increased development expenditure, other government
policies and programmes have benefited the rural
sector - directly and indirectly - during the food aid
era. Several policy reforms that were made in the early
1960s were mentioned above. Others, that were made
in the 1970s after liberation, pertain to procurement,
taxation and exchange-rate policies.
Food grain operations: the government has operated
an internal rice procurement programme in Bangla-
desh almost continuously since the wartime period of
the 1940s. The initial motivation for procurement was
to secure through compulsory levy all surplus grain
that was available in the countryside for public-sector
ration distribution in non-producer, mainly urban,
areas. It was fundamentally a supply operation, not a
price support mechanism for farmers [Knight 1954].
Government ration shop in Dacca.
48
The system remained essentially unchanged through
the 1950s and 1960s, with compulsory procurement
maintained primarily in the border areas to discourage
smuggling. In most areas procurement was generally
voluntary. In absolute terms, or as a percentage of
public-sector food distribution, the procurement
programme up to the mid-1970s was not large. The
procurement price did, however, function in varying
degrees as a floor price to farmers. Once more in
1973-76 the government reverted in a food crisis
situation to compulsion to sustain supplies to the
public distribution system, giving prominence to
procurement sustained by the subsequent change of
policy.
In 1975/76, the government began to use procurement
explicitly as an instrument of producer price support:
the procurement price of rice was raised substantially
relative to market prices, and it was announced during
the aman planting period (previously, prices had been
announced at harvest time). Thus, procurement prices
began to function more as incentive support prices for
farmers than as floor prices, and the response was
dramatic. Curiously, food aid played a key role in the
procurement policy shift, although in a rather perverse
way. Food aid donors had informally agreed to
underwrite total import requirements for Bangladesh;
but cereals food aid is virtually all wheat, which does
not satisfy the ration system requirements for rice, the
preferred grain. To satisfy its ration system
constituents (public servants, military, students, etc),
the government had to turn to domestic procurement
a the source of rice. The primary motivation for
procurement, as in the early years, was still to supply
the ration system. Whatever the motivation, the
effects for farmers of a more positive procurement
policy dependent on voluntary sales were higher
effective floor prices and some degree of price
stabilisation. Again, as with subsidies on inputs, the
intersectoral resource transfers inherent in procure-
ment purchases primarily benefited surplus farmers
with access to the procurement system.
Agriculture's declining tax burden: the history of
agricultural (primarily land) taxation in Bengal is long
and controversial. What is striking about the recent
past is the virtual absence of all direct taxes on the
agricultural sector, the sector which accounts for more
than half of GDP. During the early 1950s, after
abolition of Zamindari intermediaries, land revenues
accounted for roughly 15 per cent of total direct tax
receipts. The percentage rose to 30 per cent by the
early 1960s, but dropped back to 15 per cent for the
remainder of the decade. In addition to land taxes, the
government taxed upper-level agricultural incomes,
mainly the tea estates, which yielded two per cent of
total tax revenues during the 1960s.
In 1972 after liberation, the new Bangladesh
Government effectively eliminated agricultural land
taxes by exempting virtually all except tea estates.
Further, the government suspended agricultural
income taxes in 1974, and abolished them altogether
two years later. While some incidental local taxes
remained in the post-liberation period, the direct tax
burden of the agricultural sector during the past
decade has been virtually nil.
The net indirect tax burden on agriculture is difficult
to determine. The standard argument that low food
prices due to food aid imports have taxed farmers
excessively does not seem to hold in view of the price
analysis above. That food imports prevented higher
profits or resource transfers to agriculture by
dampening scarcity prices is certain. However,
Bangladesh has almost continually had an overvalued
exchange rate which implicitly taxed exports but kept
import prices low, with both positive and negative
implications for agriculture. Modern inputs to
production - mostly imported - have been cheaper,
benefiting food grain production, an import-
substitution activity which has utilised most of the
imported inputs. But jute production, which is largely
exported, has been taxed indirectly by overvaluation
(the benefits from cheaper input prices notwith-
standing). Given the relative importance of sectoral
earnings from rice versus jute, the net benefit to the
farm sector from overvaluation has probably been
positive, although for individual farmers the reverse
may have been the case.
Resource constraints and aid dependency
Bangladesh has had a persistent balance of payments
problem. Most capital and many intermediate goods,
including energy, have necessarily been imported,
while export earnings to finance imports have been
derived predominantly from a single agricultural
commodity: jute. The growing food deficits and
consequent food imports have cut into the forign
exchange resources available for development imports.
Moreover, as jute and rice compete for land, periodic
food crop short-falls have inevitably led to short-run
declines in jute acreage and production which in turn
reduced foreign exchange earnings, adding to current
account deficits and long-term debt.
Two terms-of-trade crises - one following the Korean
war and the other in the early 1 970s - underscored the
vulnerability of Bängladesh's trade structure to
external economic pressure. In 1952 at the end of the
Korean war commodity pricç boom, Pakistan's
overall terms-of-trade index fell 39 per cent over two
years; East Pakistan's jute export prices fell 50 per cent
in one quarter. The government's initial response to
this crisis was to impose strict controls on trade
through export taxes, tariffs, and quantitative
restrictions on imports. These policies, which
'represented an almost classic case of turning the
(domestic) terms of trade against agriculture and
protecting domestic manufacturing' [Lewis 1968:63],
eventually gave way to more open trade policies, with
reductions in export taxes on agricultural goods.
Growing foreign aid also helped to finance import
requirements. By the late 1960s, the terms of trade had
recovered to Korean war levels (in part due to the
Vietnam war commodity price boom), and the volume
of exports reached new highs.
The second terms-of-trade crisis occurred in the early
1970s during the period of rapid inflation in world
food and energy prices. The overall terms of trade fell
32 per cent in one year, and reached a low point two
years later at 56 per cent of the pre-crisis level. This
crisis hit just after liberation when the economy was
still in disarray, and it was compounded by a series of
poor harvests caused by drought and flooding which
simultaneously increased the need for food imports
and reduced the quantities ofjute available for export.
The severity of the balance of payments problem
facing Bangladesh in the 1970s is reflected in the ratio
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of annual export earnings to import expenditures
which for most of the decade was less than 40 per cent.
In contrast, during the entire decade of the l960s, East
Pakistan exports covered 84 per cent of total visible
imports, including inter-wing trade with West
Pakistan.
In the short-term, Bangladesh had little recourse but
to depend on foreign aid to meet minimum food
consumption requirements and to maintain develop-
ment projects and investments. By the late l970s, total
foreign aid flows to Bangladesh as accounted in the
budget were equivalent to more than 10 per cent of
GDP and 75 per cent of development expenditures
[World Bank 1980]. Food aid in the latter period
contributed roughly one-quarter of total foreign aid.
Food aid helped to mitigate the balance of payments
crisis of the mid- 1970s. But Bangladesh was still
obliged to purchase substantial quantities of food
commercially [Islam 1977:1111. In fact, in its attempt
to ensure a minimum supply of food grains, the
country spent itself into 'bankruptcy' in 1974, which
meant that it had to agree to a consortium of aid
donors under the auspices of the World Bank. In spite
of the high level of food imports - which, relative to
total export revenues, were two and one-half times
higher than in any other major food-deficit country
during the late 1960s and early 1970s {Siamwalla and
Valdes 1980] - significant adjustments in food
consumption were also taking place internally -
people went hungry and starved. Table 3 shows the
relationship between aid resource transfers and export
Table 3
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Aid disbursements compared with export earnings in Bangladesh
(million US dollars - current)
Notes: ' 70-75 per cent of export earnings come from jute and jute commodities
2 provisional figures.
Source: Planning Commission; IBRD [l980.
earnings during the l970s. In FY 75, total current
export earnings would not even have paid for food-aid
imports, let alone the 687,000 tons of commercial food
imports and all other imports items.
Public sector domestic resource mobilisation for
current and investment expenditures has also been
closely linked to foreign trade and aid. On the one
hand, taxes on imports have consistently provided
about one-third of total government revenue in the
l970s, even though a few 'items of essential need' such
as food grains, edible oils, fertiliser, and seed have
been exempt from import duties. On the other hand,
but not accounted for in the revenue budget,
concessional commodity aid that is sold domestically
on government account has generated substantial
extra-budgetary finance, so-called counterpart funds.
For example, in 1978-79, food grain imports to
Bangladesh totalling 1,165,000 tons were financed on
concessional terms, the financial cost to Bangladesh
being only 10 per cent of cif value. Subsequent ration
system sales resulted in a net financial contribution
from food aid equivalent to 11 per cent of total
revenue, or nine per cent of the total development
expenditure, in 1978/79. The implicit budgetary
dependence on food aid was even higher in most other
years during the 1970s.
Budgetary dependence on food aid involves an
inherent conflict between aid and agricultural develop-
ment, which is manifest in the opposite perspectives of
a recient country's finance and agriculture ministries.
The Ministry of Agriculture, which is in charge of
fiscal
year
total
aid
of which,
food
aid
food aid
as%of
total aid
merchandise
export
earningst
ratio of
total aid!
export earnings
ratio of
food aid!
export earnings
1971/72 227 103 45 na
1972/73 421 121 29 340 1.24 0.36
1973/74 640 300 47 362 1.77 0.83
1974/75 924 380 41 358 2.58 1.06
1975/76 814 307 38 380 2.14 0.81
1976/77 502 106 21 460 1.09 0.23
1977/78 797 190 24 497 1.60 0.38
1978/79 1016 187 18 603 1.68 0.31
1979/802 1366 394 29 743 1.84 0.53
production programmes, is organised to promote
increased farm productivity and output. The Ministry
of Finance, on the other hand, loses an important
source of revenue as domestic production increases
and aid financed imports decrease. As food aid has
historically been broadly additional to other aid, the
revenue losses from a reduction in food aid are
generally not compensated for by other forms of aid.
The inter-ministerial budget debates in Bangladesh, as
well as the aid consortium negotiations, have
continually grappled with this conflict. Even the data
reflect the different incentive structures: the Ministry
of Agriculture's estimates of food production (or
prices) have been uniformly higher (lower) than
corresponding estimates made by the food or finance
ministries. In the final analysis, the actual budget
allocations to various sectors have reflected the
compromises. reached in the planning process. What
would have been agriculture's investment share, or the
level of food and agricultural subsidies, in the absence
of food aid resource transfers, is a subject only for
speculation.
In principle, counterpart funds from food aid sales are
supposed to be used only for development projects. In
practice, their use is virtually impossible to document.
Even where they are explicitly linked to additional
activities, assessment is ultimately a matter of
judgement. During the 1970s in Bangladesh, the
consumption subsidies transferred through the ration
system were greater than the revenues generated by the
sale of food aid commodities. In the absence of these
counterpart funds, the high level of consumption
subsidies simply could not have been maintained
without a significant reduction in development
expenditure. Recent history has also shown that
during periods of financial crisis, successive govern-
ments have steadily maintained the food subsidies,
which, in effect, has made development investment
and implementation a residual category. The
consumption imperative as perceived by the govern-
ment has thus determined, in part, the level and pace
of development.
Even if the food subsidies were significantly rçduced
or phased out entirely, the larger issue for Bangladesh
is the need to mobilise additional resources from
within. During the l950s, the gross domestic savings
rate in Pakistan averaged roughly six per cent of GNP.
By the late l960s, the rate for East Pakistan had risen
to 10 per cent [Alamgir and Rahman 1974], but in the
context of political and economic policies that
ultimately brought about the painful birth of an
independent Bangladesh.
The crises of the post-liberation period, however,
brought about a collapse of the economy to the extent
that 101 per cent of the GDP in 1977 went for current
consumption, at lowerper cap ita levels than during the
1960s. Aggregate domestic savings were negative.
Foreign aid was equivalent to total investment plus
one per cent of current consumption.
Yet, as evidenced by the high rates of return to private
investment in the new agricultural technologies,
surpluses are being generated by a sub-group in the
farm sector that, in the aggregate, are not being
captured for investment. Direct agricultural land and
income taxes are effectively non-existent, excise taxes
and export duties on agricultural commodities are
minimal, and indirect taxation of the farm sector
through price and exchange rate policies is probably,
on balance, negative. The question for Bangladesh is
not whether these surpluses should be taxed for
investment purposes, but when and how. The
difficulties of designing appropriate tax mechanisms,
which should not be understated, involve both
distributional and cost-effectiveness issues.
Possible Incentive Effects
Public works programme
The Rural Works Programme of the 1960s was
designed specifically to provide a new framework of
organisation to rehabilitate, maintain, and develop
rural physical infrastructure - canals, embankments,
and roads - which would contribute directly to
farmers' incentives for increasing agricultural pro-
duction and marketing. The organisational framework
of planning and implementation was decentralised.
Finance, however, was provided directly from
counterpart funds from food aid. Thomas [1968]
estimated that the net annual increase in the value of
production due to the cumulative progress of the
works programme was equivalent to 2.5 per cent of
total rice production with an implied benefit/cost
ratio of 4.0 for East Pakistan. Thomas also considered
that the programme was largely additional to other
development expenditure: that
had it been necessary to obtain the necessary
resources from the rural people or to add the cost of
the programme to the already overcommitted
development budget, it is highly questionable
whether a programme large enough to be of
significance could have been launched. The
increased rural incomes generated new demand for
food commodities, thus making a larger PL 480
programme possible, while the works programme,
without substantial foreign exchange costs, pro-
vided a productive use for PL 480 aid that was
non-inflationary and promoted agricultural growth.
[Thomas 1968:290]
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Ultimately this decentralised programme, linked to
the increasingly corrupted and discredited system of
basic democracy [Sobhan 1968] collapsed in the
period of political instability leading up to the
liberation war. The major economic criticism levelled
at the programmes is not that rural works have failed
to enhance productive capacity but that the
distribution of likely benefits would be highly skewed
to landlords and richer surplus producers.
For a variety of reasons, including the general
breakdown in administration, the public works
programme in Bangladesh initially lacked momentum
during the post-liberation period. The character of the
programme was changed dramatically before it began
to expand rapidly in the mid-l970s. First, it had been
transferred from the Ministry of Rural Development
to the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation. Second,
the design of works projects was now centralised in the
new ministry, but the projects were actually controlled
by various outside (foreign) agencies and implemented
through local contractors rather than through local
government committees. Third, and related to this,
there were problems of coordination between different
projects within the same regions. Fourth, wages were
now paid in kind, not out of counterpart funds; hence
the new name: the Food for Work Programme. This
programme, the largest supported by food aid, has
been the subject of intense controversy. The in-depth
evaluation by the Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies and IFPRI will, it is hoped, produce a broad
and balanced assessment of the impact of food for
work.
Food aid and market development
One criticism of food aid has rested on the
'inappropriate commodity' argument: supplying
wheat to a rice culture, it is argued, not only represents
a form of cultural imperialism, but the practice over
time might also develop a country's taste, and
therefore a demand, for a product which in some
environments can only be imported.
In Bangladesh the argument cannot be sustained in
this simple form. First, while it is true that wheat has
been, and still is, considered an inferior commodity
compared to rice, its supply has represented a cheaper
source of calories than rice, whether through
concessional or commercial purchase importation.
The different demand elasticities for wheat and rice
across income groups reflecting actual consumption
suggests an opportunity for targeting the benefits from
food aid wheat to the poor. The extent to which this
has been achieved requires careful analysis of the
operation of the public distribution system [Ahmed
l979].
4See for example Jackson [1982] for a summary of critical evidence
and further references.
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Second, many regions (soil types) in Bangladesh are
well-suited for the production of wheat during the dry
season, with or without irrigation. The development
of a taste for wheat through exposure to food aid over
the past 25 years has spurred a domestic market and
thereby facilitated a rapid expansion of wheat
production. From about 23,000 tons annually during
the l950s, wheat production rose to some 200,000 tons
by the late 1960s, and to around 12 mn tons in
1980/81. The wheat boom of the late l970s more than
compensated for the slower growth in rice production
during the same period. It had a significant positive
effect on output of calories and protein and rural
employment, even allowing for substitution of wheat
for pulses and oilseeds.
Conclusions
Bangladesh is frequently cited as an example of the
adverse affects of food aid on domestic agriculture.
Yet the evidence does not sustain this view. The direct
price effects of food-aid imports to Bangladesh during
the past 25 years do not appear to have caused
disincentives to farmers; rather, domestic rice prices
for most of the period were higher than world prices.
Nor did the domestic terms of trade move against
farmers, nor the profitability of food grain production
decline vis-à-vis other crop alternatives. The high-
yielding varieties that were introduced during the
l960s greatly enhanced profitability.
The major constraint on the growth of food grain
productivity and production was the inadequate
supply of modern agricultural inputs, which was
primarily due to an overall capital resource constraint
in Bangladesh. A wider analysis of the rural economy
also suggests that there are other structural constraints
on facilitating agricultural development through the
price mechanism. Only a small minority of producers
are well placed to benefit from output price incentives
and have favoured access to subsidised inputs.
Food aid resource transfers made a major contribution
toward alleviating the foreign exchange constraint,
thus allowing for higher investment in intermediate
goods imports than would have been the case without
food aid. Regarding development policy, the evidence
suggests that the food aid resource transfers were used
more efficiently, or productively, during the l960s
than during the l970s, but in a context that probably
was not sustained. The l970s have been more
turbulent in terms of both the domestic political, and
the world economic, environment. The tensions in
macro economic and agricultural sector policies are
more severe. It is, however, difficult to envisage a
sustainable counterfactual scenario in which signifi-
cantly lower levels of food aid would have resulted in
more rapid and equitable agricultural development.
For references see page 61.
